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Barnaby Horton and Peter Grace, pupils in the Connecticut public
school system, brought an action in Connecticut superior court chal-
lenging that state's system of financing elementary and secondary edu-
cation as violative of state and federal equal protection. The court found
that the Connecticut system of financing schools produced significant
interdistrict disparities in per pupil educational expenditures and that
these- disparities, although not violative of federal equal protection, did
violate state constitutional guarantees of equal protection. 2
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the educa-
tion article of the Connecticut Constitution establishes free public educa-
tion as a fundamental right in that state; that any action by the state
denying equal protection of that right is subject to strict judicial scrutiny;
and that the interdistrict disparities found by the trial court denied the
plaintiffs equal protection of that right.3
Equal protection challenges to school financing systems are prem-
ised upon the notion that the state can promote equal educational op-
portunity only by guaranteeing equal per pupil educational expenditure
in every school district in the state.4 Monies allocated in this manner
are said to be "equalized." Unfortunately, few school financing systems
meet this ideal. Typically, school districts are financed from three rev-
enue sources: state and federal grants, and local property tax receipts.
State and federal grants, which in most states are distributed according
to each district's need, do tend to equalize the amount of money availa-
ble to each school district. Local property tax receipts, on the other
hand, are "unequalized" because they are generated, not according to
the district's need, but in direct proportion to the amount of taxable
wealth located within the district's boundaries. This local contribution
often produces interdistrict disparities of such a magnitude as to over-
1. 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
2. Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn. Supp. 377, 332 A.2d 113 (Super. Ct. 1974).
3. 376 A.2d at 374-75.
4. See generally A. WIsE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS-THE PROMISE OF
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1968); J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGERMAN,
PRIVATE WEALTH and PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
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come the equalizing influence of state aid. Thus it is actually the con-
stitutionality of local property taxes which is at issue in the school
financing cases.
The first challenges to local property tax financing of public educa-
tion were brought under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.5 Although the United
States Supreme Court affirmed per curiam two early district court deci-
sions sustaining "unequalized" school financing systems, 6 this authority
was sufficiently ambiguous to allow a succession of state and lower fed-
eral courts to distinguish it and overturn school financing systems in a
number of states.7
In 1973 the Supreme Court ended this trend with its landmark de-
cision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,8 which re-
versed a federal district court's order overturning the Texas school
financing system. The Court held that education is not a "fundamental
right" under the fourteenth amendmentY This finding led the Court to
apply the "rational basis" test of equal protection and to find local fiscal
control of schools to be an adequate justification for sustaining interdis-
trict disparities in per pupil expenditure. 10
5. The Supreme Court applies a two-tiered standard of review in deciding
whether a discriminatory classification violates federal equal protection. In cases
involving social or economic regulation, a state-created classification will be up-
held if it has any rational basis whatsoever. However, a classification which af-
fects "fundamental rights" or which is "inherently suspect" will be struck down
unless the state can show that the classification is necessary to achieve a compel-
ling state interest. See generally Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Edu-
cation, Municipal Services and Wealth, 7 HARV. C.R.C.L.L. REv. 105 (1972); Com-
ment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70
MICH. L. REV. 1324 (1972); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 1065 (1969).
6. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970), affg per curiam 310 F. Supp.
572 (W.D. Va. 1969); Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), affg per curiam
McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
7. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870
(D. Minn. 1971); Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Serrano v. Priest
(Serrano I), 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601; Sweetwater County
Planning Comm'n v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971),juris. relinquished, 493
P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972). Contra, Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md.
1972); Spano v. Board of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct.
1972).
8. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts,
51 TEX. L. REv. 411, 500-04 (1973). Only one case has been decided exclusively
on federal equal protection grounds since Rodriguez was handed down. Lafayette
Steel Co. v. Dearborn, 360 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
9. 411 U.S. at 30-35.
10. Id. at 49-55.
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Although the Supreme Court has chosen a narrow application of
federal equal protection with respect to public school financing, the state
courts are free to apply a stricter standard of review in interpreting the
equal protection provisions of their respective state constitutions.11 Until
Horton v. Meskill, however, there was no reliable authority to challenge a
school financing system on state equal protection grounds.12
The point of greatest contention in the school financing cases has
been whether education should be considered a fundamental right.
11. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764-65, 557 P.2d 929, 950,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 364; Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635,
645 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 490, 303 A.2d 273, 282, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973). See also Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of
Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.C.L.L. REV. 271 (1973); Lipson, Serrano v. Priest, I and II: The
Continuing Role of the California Supreme Court in Deciding Questions Arising Under
the California Constitution, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 697, 707 (1976).
12. Cases finding no equal protection violation: Hootch v. Alaska, 536 P.2d
793 (Alaska 1975); Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973);
Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Governor v. State
Treasurer, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J.
473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9,
554 P.2d 139 (1976); Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash.
1974). Contra, Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976) (dictum).
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1976), used the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection to overturn
California's system of financing schools. However, this decision has been ques-
tioned on two grounds.
First, when the California court originally decided the case it did not con-
sider the state equal protection claim which was raised on appeal, noting that the
California equal protection clause had been construed as: "'substantially the
equivalent' of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
such that our analysis of plaintiffs' federal equal protection contention is also
applicable to their claim under these state constitutional provisions." Serrano v.
Priest (Serrano I)1 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596 n. 11, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601, 609 n.11. After the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, the California
court reheard the Serrano case, but managed to affirm its earlier decision on state
grounds. To do this the court was required to hold, its earlier decision to the
contrary notwithstanding, that the California equal protection clause was pos-
sessed of "independent vitality." Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728,
762-65, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 365-67 (1976). See Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d at 379 (Loiselle, J. dissenting); Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State
Court's Responsibilities and Opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional
Law, 60 CAL. L. REv. 720, 743-48 (1972) (questioning whether an independent
state ground was raised in Serrano I). Second, it is not clear from Serrano II
whether a classification not involving both a "fundamental right" and an "inher-
ently suspect" classification would invoke strict judicial scrutiny. 18 Cal. 3d at
766, n.45, 557 P.2d at 951 n.45, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367 n.45. This uncertainty is
particularly troublesome in view of the persuasiveness of Justice Powell's argu-
ment in Rodriguez that wealth is not a suspect classification, 411 U.S. at 19-28,
and the California court's failure to answer its dissenting member's observation
that there is no positive correlation between individual wealth and district wealth.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d at 793, 557 P.2d at 969-70, 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 385-86 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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Under the two-tiered standard of equal protection, if education were
deemed a fundamental right, any denial of that right would be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny.1 3  For several years the United States Supreme
Court applied an ad hoc test in deciding whether a certain right was fun-
damental without ever having precisely defined the test.14 The result
was an open-ended definition which has been criticized for enabling the
Court to "[circumscribe] legislative choices in the name of newly articu-
lated values that lacked clear support in constitutional text and his-
tory."' 5 Most of the pre-Rodriguez school financing decisions adopted
this analysis.' 6
In Rodriguez the Supreme Court declared school financing cases to
be sui generis and applied a special "explicit-implicit" test for deciding
whether education is a fundamental right. The test looked to whether
"there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution." 1 The state courts, however, have not been inclined to
apply this highly mechanical test to their "compendious, comprehensive,
and distinctly mutable" constitutions.' 8
An alternative test was offered by Justice Brennan in his dissent to
Rodriguez. It is a "nexus" test which assumes that "'fundamentality' is, in
large measure, a function of the right's importance in terms of effectua-
tion of those rights which are in fact constitutionally guaranteed."' 9
Under this test education is a fundamental right because of its impact on
the individual's ability to exercise other indisputably fundamental rights,
13. See note 5 supra.
14. See Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1076 (D. Md. 1972); Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1127 (1969); Comment,
The Evolution of Equal Protection: Education, Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 HARV.
C.R.C.L.L. Ruv. 103 (1972); Comment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection of
the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1324, 1330-31 (1972).
15. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). See also Vieira, Unequal Educational Expendi-
tures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L. REv. 617, 621 (1972).
16. See cases cited notes 6 & 7 supra.
17. 411 U.S. at 33-34. For an earlier articulation of this test by a federal
circuit court, see Flemming v. Adams, 377 F.2d 975, 977 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 898 (1967). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970),
noted in Newan, Equal Protection-A Judicial Cease Fire in the War on Poverty?, 36
Mo. L. REv. 117 (1971), which suggests that the right must be one guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights.
18. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 767, 557 P.2d 929, 952,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 368 (1976). Accord, Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139,
144 (1976). See also Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977);
Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill,
62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). Two state courts
have applied the Rodriguez test, but neither decision is authoritative. Governor v.
State Treasurer, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 39.0 Mich. 389,
212 N.W.2d 711 (1973); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976)
(dictum).
19. 411 U.S. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1978]
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such as the right to vote and the right of free speech. This test was
alluded to in Serrano v. Priest20 which established education as a funda-
mental right under the California Constitution. This nexus test would be
particularly effective in a school financing case brought under the Mis-
souri equal protection clause because the preamble of the Missouri edu-
cation article expressly recognizes a nexus between education and other
clearly fundamental rights: "A general diffusion of knowledge [is] essen-
tial to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people .... "121
A few courts have abandoned the mechanical two-tiered approach to
equal protection in school financing cases in favor of a balancing test
which "weigh[s] the nature of the restraint or denial against the appa-
rent public justification.122 This is a more subjective test than the others
and essentially consists of weighing competing policy considerations.
Faced with this multiplicity of equal protection tests, the Connecticut
Supreme Court gave consideration to each and concluded that education
is a fundamental right in Connecticut regardless of which test is applied.
Therefore, any infringement of that right warrants strict judicial scru-
tiny.23  In support of its conclusion, the court cited Connecticut cases
defining education as a right and duty of the state, statutes making
school attendance compulsory, the prominence of public education
throughout the history of the state, and language in the Connecticut
Constitution and statutes referring to equal educational opportunity.24
Under any of the tests discussed above there should be little doubt
that the Missouri Constitution makes education a fundamental right. In
State ex rel. Roberts v. Wilson 25 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the
right of children to attend public school is "not a privilege dependent
upon the discretion of any one, but is afundamental right, which cannot
be denied except for the general welfare. 2 6
Furthermore, the preamble of the Missouri education article is con-
siderably more explicit than most other state constitutions in declaring
the importance of education to preserving the "rights and liberties of the
people. 12 7 This forceful language has been preserved as a part of the
20. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
21. Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 1(a).
22. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, 282, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973). Accord, Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
23. 376 A.2d at 373.
24. Id.at 373-74.
25. 297 S.W. 419 (Spr. Mo. App. 1927).
26. Id. at 420. Accord, Lehew v. Brummel, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W. 765, 766
(1890). But cf. State ex inf. Wright v. Morgan, 268 Mo. 265, 187 S.W. 54, 57
(1916) (statutes relating to schools are presumed valid); Virden v. Schaffner, 496
S.W.2d 846, 850 (Mo.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1105 (1973) (quoting Rod-
riguez with approval to the effect that taxation schemes are presumed to be
valid).
27. Compare, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. 9, § l(a) with CONN. CONST. art. 8, § 1;
CALIF. CONST. art. 9, §§ 1, 5; N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 6.
326 [Vol. 43
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Missouri Constitution since 1865 despite attempts in 1875 and 1945 to
have it excised. 2s The report of the 1875 convention's Education Com-
mittee makes it clear that the preamble was intended to establish educa-
tion as a fundamental right in Missouri: "The education of the people is
to be interwoven with the very framework of the commonwealth. It is
not to be left to the ever changing whim and indefinable caprice of the
Legislature, but is to be made organic and fundamental.
29
However, even if the Missouri Supreme Court found education to
be a fundamental right under the state constitution, it is not certain
whether the court would apply strict judicial scrutiny. The Missouri Con-
stitution has an express equal protection clause, 3 0 as well as a section
prohibiting special and local laws which has been treated as substantially
equivalent to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the federal constitution.3 1 Despite these independent state provi-
sions, whenever suit has been brought on both state and federal equal
protection grounds, the Missouri Supreme Court consistently has re-
fused to consider the scope of state equal protection apart from the
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 32 Consequently there is a
dearth of authority construing the Missouri equal protection clause. In-
deed, there is one Missouri case which appears to accept decisions of the
United States Supreme Court as controlling the scope of state equal
protection.
3 3
28. 9 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875 at
87-92 (I. Loeb & F. Shoemaker eds. 1920) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES 1875].
Transcript of the Debates of the 1945 Missouri Constitutional Convention, April
28, 1944, at 1800-03. (Transcripts of the debates are available on microfilm at
the State Historical Society in Columbia, the St. Louis Public Library, and the law
school libraries of Washington University and St. Louis University) [hereinafter
cited as Transcripts 1945].
29. 9 DEBATES 1875, supra note 28, at 27.
30. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
31. Mo. CONST. art. 3, § 40(30). See State ex rel.Toedebusch v. Public Service
Comm'n, 520 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. En Banc 1975); St. Louis Union Trust v. State,
348 Mo. 725, 155 S.W.2d 107 (1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 700 (1942).
32. See, e.g., In re Interest of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1973) (upholding
statutory rape statute which discriminated against males); State v. Stock, 463
S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1971) (upholding classification of marijuana as a narcotic);
A.B.C. Liquidators, Inc. v. Kansas City, 322 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1959) (upholding
ban on Sunday auctions).
33. Gem Stores, Inc. v. O'Brien, 374 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. En Banc 1964). The
case was brought on both federal and state equal protection grounds:
The constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection
of the laws as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States
are binding on this court. Nevertheless, decisions of this state are in
harmony with the federal cases .... Adjudged by these standards
[citing a U.S. Supreme Court decision], the [statute] does not violate
the due process and equal protection provisions of the state or federal
constitutions....
Id. at 117 (emphasis added). But see authorities cited note 11 supra.
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Two cases have been brought exclusively under the Missouri equal
protection clause, Bopp v. Spainhower 34 and State ex rel. Dreer v. Public
School Retirement System. 35 Neither opinion distinguished state from fed-
eral equal protection. In Bopp the Missouri Supreme Court depreciated
state equal protection to the extent of holding that the rational basis test
was the appropriate standard of review when "no specific federal right,
apart from equal protection, is imperiled. '36 Neither of these state
equal protection decisions applied strict scrutiny. There has been only
one Missouri case applying strict scrutiny to federal equal protection, 
37
although the Missouri Supreme Court has taken notice of this higher
standard of review on several occasions. 38 Otherwise, the Missouri court
has consistently applied the rational basis test, 39 even in cases involving
"fundamental rights"4 0 or "inherently suspect classifications." 41 Thus it
appears unlikely that the Missouri Supreme Court would extend the
scope of state equal protection beyond the holding of Rodriguez.
Even if the Missouri court would apply strict scrutiny to public
school financing, the Missouri school financingsystem has several
"equalizing" features which might remove it beyond the scope of Horton
v. Meskill. In Missouri the relative contributions of the three sources of
school revenues in 1976-77 were 6.4% federal, 41.8% state, and 51.8%
34. 519 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
35. 519 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1975).
36. 519 S.W.2d at 289 (emphasis added).
37. State v. Ewing, 518 S.W.2d 643, 649 (Mo. 1975) (strict scrutiny applied to
classification affecting the freedom from restraint and compulsion).
38. Bopp v. Spainhower, 519 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. En Banc 1975); In re Interest
of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1973); State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 483 S.W.2d
70 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
39. As articulated by the Missouri Supreme Court, the rational basis test re-
quires that the classification be "reasonable and [bear] a fair and substantial re-
lationship to the object of [the statute] and that all persons similarly classified
[be] treated alike under that statute." In re Interest of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786,
793 (Mo. 1973). Another line of authority requiring only that "all persons in the
same class [be] treated with equality," King v. Swenson, 423 S.W.2d 699, 705
(Mo. En Banc 1968), apparently has been overruled by State v. Baker, 524
S.W.2d 122 (Mo. En Banc 1975), for failing to require some relevance to the
purpose of the statute. See also Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 815 (Mo.
En Banc 1959).
40. Bopp v. Spainhower, 519 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. En Banc 1975) (right to vote
on imposition of local sales tax); Kansas City v. Webb, 484 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. En
Banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972) (right to common law jury in con-
demnation suit). But see Rodgers v. Danforth, 486 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. En Banc
1972) (Seiler, J. dissenting) (applying strict scrutiny to a classification affecting
right of procreation); State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 483 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. En Banc
1972) (Seiler, J. dissenting) (applying strict scrutiny to classification affecting
freedom of association and right to cast an effective ballot).
41. In re Interest of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1973) (sex as a suspect
classification). But see State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11, 25 (Mo. 1977) (Seller, J.
dissenting) (applying a higher standard of review to classifications based on sex).
[Vol. 43328
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local. 42 In other words, equalized and unequalized revenues were con-
tributed in roughly equal proportions. In Connecticut, where the relative
contributions of these three sources were 5% federal, 25% state, and
70% local, unequalized revenues outweighed equalized revenues more
than two to one. 4 3 Another equalizing feature of Missouri's school
financing system is its foundation program for allocating state aid to
local school districts. In Connecticut each school district received a flat
per pupil grant from the state regardless of how much the district raised
from local property tax receipts. 4 4 In Missouri the recently amended
foundation program guarantees every district a minimum per pupil
foundation level of funding and provides districts having low per pupil
assessed valuation an additional grant designed to overcome disparities
created by the presence or absence of taxable wealth within their bound-
aries. 45
Nonetheless, Missouri still suffers substantial interdistrict disparties
in per pupil expenditure. Projected per pupil expenditure in Missouri
for the 1977-78 school year, even under the new state aid distribution
formula, ranges from an average $1,045 per pupil for schools in the
bottom five percentile to an average $1,674 per pupil for schools in the
top five percentile.46
More dramatic are comparisons between individual school districts.
In 1977-78 the Leopold R-III school district in Bollinger County is pro-
jected to spend only $921 per pupil in average daily attendance; the
Clayton school district in St. Louis County is projected to spend $2,996
per pupil in average daily attendance. 47  These disparities are due
primarily to differences in the amount of taxable wealth per pupil found
in each district. It is not merely coincidental that assessed valuation per
pupil in average daily attendance is only $4,155 per pupil in the Leopold
42. MissouRi BOARD OF EDUCATION, STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION'S REPORT
ON MISSOURI PUBLIC SCHOOLS FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1977, Table l(a).
43. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d at 366.
44. Id.
45. Ch. 160, RSMo 1969, as amended by H.B. 131, 79th Gen. Assembly, 1st
Reg. Sess. (1977).
46. Missouri State School Funding Simulation, May 4, 1977 (computer
print-out made available to the author through the courtesy of the Missouri State
Teachers' Association).
47. These figures were obtained by adding projected increases in state aid
for 1977-78 under the new foundation program to documented per pupil ex-
penditures for 1976-77. Projected increases in state aid for 1977-78 were taken
from Missouri State School Funding Simulation, supra note 45. Figures for
1976-77 were taken from Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education, Statistical Report #3 Distributed By School Data Section for Internal
Use (to be published in MissouRI DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
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R-III district compared with $73,242 per pupil in the Clayton district.4s
This disparity in assessed valuation means that a given tax levy would
generate eighteen times more revenue per pupil in Clayton than in
Leopold R-III.
Given these figures it is apparent that, regardless of an individual
district's tax effort, wealthy districts in Missouri have significantly more
money per pupil to spend on education than do poorer districts, and
that therefore the Missouri system remains susceptible to an equal pro-
tection challenge. Indeed, it is difficult to see how any school financing
system relying on local property tax revenues can overcome financing
disparities to satisfy the equal protection test applied by the Connecticut
court.
49
If an equal protection challenge under the state constitution should
prove untenable, there are other constitutional provisions which might
be used to challenge existing school financing systems. In Robinson v.
Cahill5 0 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state's school
financing system failed to provide the "thorough and efficient system of
schools" mandated in the New Jersey Constitution. 51 Courts of other
states have dealt with the question whether their respective constitutions
establish a qualitative standard for public education, but none have fol-
lowed Robinson.52 Some of these courts have based their decisions on
the absence of constitutional language capable of construction as a qual-
itative standard; 53 others have refused to recognize such a standard even
in language more explicit than that in the New Jersey Constitution.54
48. Statistical Report #3 Distributed By School Data Section for Internal Use,
supra note 46.
49. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1976), invalidated the California school financing system under the
strict scrutiny standard of equal protection even though only 10% of the system's
revenues were unequalized.
50. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
51. N.J. CONsT. art. 8, § 4, para. 1 provides: "The Legislature shall provide
for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free
public schools .... "
52. Hootch v. Alaska, 536 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1975); Shoftstall v. Hollins, 110
Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d
359 (1977); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Blase
v. State, 55 Ill. 2d 94, 302 N.E.2d 46 (1973); Governor v. State Treasurer, 389
Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated on other grounds, 390 Mich. 389, 212
N.W.2d 711 (1973); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Northshore
School Dist. v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d
550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976) (dictum).
53. See, e.g., Hootch v. Alaska, 536 P.2d 793, 804 (Alaska 1975).
54. See, e.g., Blase v. State, 55 Ill. 2d 94, 302 N.E.2d 46 (1973) (the court
held that the constitutional language: "The State shall provide for an efficient
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It is not likely that the Missouri Constitution is susceptible to the
New Jersey court's analysis. The section of the Missouri Constitution es-
tablishing free public schools makes no reference to the quality or kind
of education to be provided.5 5 However, Missouri does have a some-
what obscure constitutional provision which arguably mandates a mini-
mal level of state support for public schools. Section 3 (b) of the educa-
tion article 56 [hereinafter referred to as the "deficiency clause"] pro-
vides:
In event the public school fund provided and set apart by law
for the support of free public schools shall be insufficient to
sustain free schools at least eight months in every school year in
each district of the State, the general assembly may provide for
such deficiency ....
Although the deficiency clause never has been used to challenge the
adequacy of state support for public education, such a use would not be
inconsistent with the history and purpose of the section.
The deficiency clause first became a part of the Missouri Constitu-
tion in 1865.57 It simply authorized the general assembly to provide by
statute for the levying of a local property tax if contributions from the
state and county school funds5 proved insufficient to keep schools open
at least four months out of the year.59 In State ex rel. Sharp v. Miller 60
the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted words contained in the defi-
ciency clause, "the general assembly may provide," to be an absolute
mandate to the legislature and not simply an acknowledgement of legis-
lative discretion.6 1 The 1865 version of the deficiency clause did not
require the general assembly to provide direct financial support to local
school districts.
The deficiency clause acquired a new dimension in the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1875 when the convention, although committed to
state support of public education, failed in its initial attempt to provide
55. Mo. CONST. art. 9, § l(a). The Education Committee of the 1875 Mis-
souri Constitutional Conventional Convention declined to adopt a resolution
calling for the addition of the words "thorough and efficient" to the language of
this section. 1 JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875
at 187 (I. Loeb & F. Shoemaker eds. 1920).
56. Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 3(b).
57. Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. 9, § 8.
58. The county school fund consisted of the income and proceeds from land
designated by the federal government to be used for school purposes. The state
school fund was established out of the proceeds from escheats, penalties, fines,
forfeitures, the sale of public lands and estrays, and "so much of the ordinary
revenue of the State as may be necessary." Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. 9, § 5.
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for minimum legislative appropriations to the public school fund.0 2 To
prevent state aid to local school districts from remaining a matter of
legislative discretion, the chairman of the Education Committee intro-
duced a modified deficiency clause as a guarantee that enough money
would be appropriated to the public school fund every year to insure the
operation of a school in every district in the state.6 3 It was adopted only
after considerable debate.6 4
The Constitutional Convention of 1945 was more concerned with
school segregation than with school financing and retained the defi-
ciency clause without debate.6 5 Two minor changes made by the con-
vention's Education Committee did not alter the basic purpose of the
deficiency clause.6 6 Thus, it appears that the 1875 constitutional debate
on the deficiency clause remains authoritative as to its proper interpre-
tation-the general assembly is under a duty to remedy the operating
deficit in any school district unable to "sustain" its schools at least eight
months every year. 6
7
Whether the deficiency clause can be made a tool to challenge the
existing school financing system depends upon the meaning given the
word "sustain" as used in the deficiency clause. A court might find that
the word "sustain" implies a subjective qualitative standard as was done
62. 11 DEBATES 1875, supra note 28, at 39. Ironically the education article
eventually was amended to require at least 25% of the State's revenue be ap-
propriated annually for the support of free public schools. Id. at 282-88.
63. See 11 DEBATES 1875, supra note 28, at 243-89.
64. Id. at 289.
65. 1 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, March
10, 1944, at 2-6. See also Transcripts 1945, supra note 28, May 2, 1944, at 1852.
66. Id. One change was to raise the minimum school term from four months
to eight months. The second change was to eliminate the 1875 reference to "sec-
don eleven of the Article on Revenue and Taxation." See Mo. CONST. of 1875, art.
10, § 11. This requirement was intended by the 1875 convention to prevent the
legislature from remedying deficiencies by imposing a direct tax on districts un-
able to maintain four-month schools. See 11 DEBATES 1875, supra note 28 at
248-80. However, § 11 defined the taxing authority of political subdivisions of
the state and was not an appropriate limitation on the power of the general
assembly to tax. The Education Committee of the 1945 convention recognized
this fact and eliminated the deficiency clause's reference to § 11. Transcripts
1945, supra note 28, May 2, 1944, at 1852.
67. Although there are no cases interpreting the modern deficiency clause,
the 1875 convention clearly recognized it as a mandate to the legislature to take
direct action to remedy deficiencies in districts unable to operate a school at least
four months out of the school year. See 11 DEBATES 1875, supra note 28, at
243-89. The 1945 convention did not debate the purpose of the deficiency
clause, however, the chairman of the Education Committee did observe at one
point that: "[T]his is not a school system of isolated districts. It's a state school
system and it's the state's obligation to see that we have a school system, and if
the money doesn't come from other sources, why, I never could see anything
wrong with the state supplying the money." Transcripts 1945, supra note 28, at
1796.
11
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with the words "thorough and efficient" in Robinson v. Cahill.68  The
word might be construed to imply a constitutional requirement of equal
per pupil expenditure in all school districts in the state. A few courts
have considered the possibility that equal per pupil expenditure is im-
plicit in the legislature's duty to establish free public schools, but none
have given any support to the proposition.6 9
In Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School District7 0 the Missouri
Supreme Court was presented with a similar question when it was asked
to decide whether the state constitution's guarantee of free public
schools prohibited a school district from requiring pupils to furnish their
own "materials and equipment." The court noted that some states have
held that "books and school supplies are as much a part of providing
schools as teachers and buildings."' 7 1 Accordingly, the case was re-
manded for a determination whether books and school supplies are "an
integral part of free public schools. '7 2
The principle difficulty with this approach is that the courts would
be asked to make decisions they are not equipped to handle-decisions
that ordinarily have been reserved to the legislature and the elected
school boards. For example, faced with a deficiency arising from a dis-
trict's inability to meet teachers' salaries, the court would have to decide
whether a financially compelled cut-back in the number and quality of
teachers in the district meant that the district was unable to "sustain" its
schools. Like early federal equal protection cases framed in terms of a
denial of "educational needs," a suit alleging a school system's inability to
"sustain" its schools confronts the courts with a controversy lacking judi-
cially manageable standards.7 3 Given these problems of justiciability, it
68. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
69. Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635, 647 (1975); North-
shore School Dist. v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 217 (Wash. 1974) (Stafford, J., dis-
senting); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 500, 303 A.2d 273, 287, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973) (question not raised by the parties).
70. 548 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
71. Id. at 563.
72. The court instructed the trial court to consider "such proof as may be
available as to whether at the time the constitutional requirement was adopted,
the people drafting and adopting the provision understood the language to en-
compass such things as materials and equipment." Id.
73. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Wilkerson v. Burruss,
310 F. Supp. 572, 574 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'dper curiam, 397 U.S. 44 (1970). The
problem of non-justiciability raised in these two cases was subsequently obviated
by characterizing the alleged violation as a denial of "equal educational opportu-
nity." See, e.g., Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1075 (D. Md. 1972); Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest
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